Introduction
There arose in conjoined cases before Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division of the English High Court of Justice, important cross-border issues in the matter of the making of secure accommodation orders for teenage children. The cases, In the Matter of X (A Child), In the Matter of Y (A Child), raised the same issues, namely, first, the jurisdiction of an English court to make a secure accommodation order for the purpose of placing in a secure unit in Scotland a young person resident in England; and, secondly, the question of recognition and enforcement in Scotland of such an English order. Sir James summarised the issues thus:
"Can the court in country A (in the present case, England) make an order to take effect in country B (in this case, Scotland)? If so, will such an order be recognised and enforced in country B (Scotland)? The first question is to be determined by the law of country A (England); the second is one to be determined by the law of country B (Scotland)." 
The legislative framework
Part III of the Children Act 1989 ("Support for Children and Families provided by Local Authorities in England") (hereinafter "1989 Act") narrates in section 25 ("Use of accommodation for restricting liberty") the circumstances in which a child who is being looked after by a local authority may be placed, and, if placed, may be kept, in secure accommodation in England (emphasis added). A child who is being looked after by a local authority in England or Wales may not be placed, and, if placed, may not be kept, in secure accommodation unless it appears, "(a) that-(i) he has a history of absconding and is likely to abscond from any other description of accommodation; and (ii) if he absconds, he is likely to suffer significant harm; or (b) that if he is kept in any other description of accommodation he is likely to injure himself or other persons."
3 Ex facie the terms of section 25 do not authorise an English judge to make a section 25 order placing a child in Scotland. (b) suitable arrangements have been, or will be, made for his reception and welfare in the country in which he will live; (c) the child has consented to living in that country; and (d) every person who has parental responsibility for the child has consented to his living in that country.
As Sir James explained in the instant case, "It is difficult to see how the requirements of paragraph 19
of Schedule 2 to the 1989 Act will ever be satisfied where the child is to be sent out of the jurisdiction for the purpose of being placed in secure accommodation; and in the present cases they certainly are not." 12 Namely: (a) a child is subject to a ["full" -per Sir James, para 64] care order made under section 31(1)(a) of the 1989 Act [on the application of any local authority or authorised person, the court may make an order placing the child with respect to whom the application is made in the care of a designated local authority]; (b) the court has given approval under paragraph 19(1) of Schedule 2 to the 1989 Act to the local authority ("the home local authority") to arrange, or assist in arranging, for the child to live in Scotland; (c) the local authority for the area in which the child is to reside, or has moved to, in Scotland ("the receiving local authority") has, through the Principal Reporter, notified the court in writing that it agrees to take over the care of the child; and (d) the home local authority has notified the court that it agrees to the receiving local authority taking over the care of the child. See also regulation 4 re. effect of supervision order and education supervision orders made in England. 13 In invoking the inherent jurisdiction, the conditions set out in section 100 of the 1989 Act ("Restrictions on use of wardship jurisdiction") must be satisfied, including, in particular, the requirement that the result which the local authority wishes to achieve could not be achieved other than by use of the inherent jurisdiction. 19 Sir James found no "jurisdictional obstacle" 20 in the 1989
Act, taking the view that neither the mere existence of the statutory scheme, nor its substantive detail, ousted the common law prerogative. He concluded that, "It follows … that, in principle, a judge in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction can make an order directing the placement of a child in secure accommodation in Scotland. So too, in requirement of the type mentioned in s 83(2)(a) of the 2011 Act (that is, a requirement that the child reside at a specified place), the place specified in that requirement may be a place in England or Wales. By art 7(2), where a compulsory supervision order or interim compulsory supervision order contains a direction of the type mentioned in section 83(2)(b) of the 2011 Act and the place at which the child is required to reside in accordance with the order is a place in England or Wales, the order is authority for the person in charge of that place to restrict the child's liberty to the extent that the person considers appropriate having regard to the measures included in the order. There is a caveat: any judge seeking to exercise the inherent jurisdiction in this particular matter must ensure compliance with the requirements of article 5 ("Right to liberty and security") of the European Convention on Human Rights. The practical implications of a cross-border order engaged the attention of Sir James, who, conscious that any order directing the detention of a child should contain additional directions designed to facilitate easy and regular access between parents and child, was anxious to ensure, in the case of X, that the burden and cost of travelling from Cumbria to the secure unit in Scotland did not fall too heavily on X's mother. 22 Sir James was satisfied that a secure accommodation order for placement of X in Scotland would be article 5-compliant.
The President having concluded that it was competent for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction, the question arose whether or not the resulting English order would be recognised and enforced in Scotland. (hereinafter "1986 Act" 38 ), covering registration and enforcement of parental responsibility orders intra-UK, and so it is to be assumed that these provisions continue to operate intra-UK, irrespective of the recognition and enforcement provisions in Brussels II bis (Ch. III). However, in the same way that Sir James held Brussels II bis to be inapplicable to the instant case, so too he held that Part I of the 1986 Act did not apply since it is concerned "essentially" 39 only with private law proceedings. A "Part I order" means, inter alia, a section 8 order made by a court in England and Wales under the Children Act 1989, other than an order varying or discharging such an order; 40 and an order made by a court of civil jurisdiction in Scotland under any enactment or rule of law with respect to the residence, custody, care or control of a child, contact with or access to a child or the education or upbringing of a child, excluding, however, an order committing the care of a child to a local authority or placing a child under the supervision of a local authority. 41 In determining the applicability of the various legislative provisions potentially engaged in this matter, the public/private law distinction must be kept in mind.
Non-applicability of Brussels II bis 23 intra-UK
34 Art 1. 35 The term "parental responsibility" is defined in art 2(7) as meaning "all rights and duties relating to the person or the property of a child which are given to a natural or legal person by judgment, by operation of law or by an agreement having legal effect" (emphasis added In searching for a remedy to the problem at hand, it may be noted that the power is utilised in international private law in the enforcement of foreign civil and commercial judgments emanating from legal systems with which the United Kingdom enjoys no reciprocal regime. 44 This inherent jurisdiction of the Scots court is comparable with the inherent jurisdiction of the English court, on which Sir James relied in the instant case in order to supply jurisdiction in England, and it is noteworthy that the equivalent equitable jurisdiction is proposed to be relied upon in Scotland for the enforcement of that English order. However, while it is expedient that such equitable powers exist and exceptionally can supply the lack in appropriate cases -"… the common law is the great safety net which lies behind all statute law and is capable of filling gaps left by that law" 45 -the nobile officium is not an apposite mechanism for the enforcement of an English secure accommodation order which, by its nature, necessitates monitoring and review. As the President recognised, a decision (by whom, and on what basis?) would need to be taken on the question whether the Scots or the English court should discharge that responsibility.
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Filling the lacunae
Legislative provision regarding the enforcement in England of a compulsory supervision order or interim compulsory supervision order made by a court in Scotland, on the face of things, is adequate. 47 Conversely, provision for the recognition and enforcement in Scotland of a secure accommodation order made in England, has been shown to be lacking. 48 The number of cases raising this problem is uncertain, but it is clear that in those cases where it occurs, the matter is of great moment, and the President opined that remedial action is necessary.
While it is appropriate that the lacunae identified by this case should be filled, we suggest that the particular issues raised are merely one manifestation of the many difficulties and legitimate doubts which pertain to jurisdiction allocation and judgment enforcement in family (especially child) law matters as between legal systems of the UK. It is time for the legislative thicket to be pruned, and to make clear the rules which operate intra-UK -a pressing matter in itself, but also in preparation for such changes in the law governing international jurisdiction allocation and judgment enforcement as will be required by the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union.
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